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PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
Servitudes
The Louisiana law of servitudes is a fascinating subject to those
who find interest in an interwoven pattern of civil law principles.
While some of these were more meaningful in the historical condi-
tions of property for which they were formulated, most of them are
still serving well as a basis for regulating legal relations in the field
of law which they cover. These titles in the Louisiana Civil Code
are the embodiment of a great deal of civil law doctrine. The word
"servitude" is a technical term, and the inaccurate use of the word
in a more general sense is not only misleading in its immediate con-
text, it creites the dangerous possibility of switching a whole line
of interpretation into a wrong direction. This is what happened in
the case of Mallet v. Thibault' in which the court asserted that "the
creation of a personal servitude by convention will be approved pro-
vided, of course, that it does not contravene the public order."2 This
conclusion is based upon (1) the finding of irreconcilability between
certain code provisions which are not conflicting but rather cor-
roborative 3 and (2) the use as authority, for a basic doctrinal ques-
tion, of a mineral rights case4 which represents at best a tenuous
extension of the law of servitudes for want of any better device in
the available legal materials.
Article 709 of the Civil Code provides that "Owners have a
right to establish on their estates, or in favor of their estates, such
servitude as they deem proper; provided, nevertheless, that the serv-
ices be not imposed on the person or in favor of the person, but
only on an estate or in favor of an estate; and provided, moreover,
that such services imply nothing contrary to public order." This
appears in Book 11, Title IV "Of Predial Servitudes or Servitudes of
Land" and it reiterates the first basic principle of predial servitudes
that they constitute essentially a relationship between two estates.'
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 31 So. (2d) 601 (La. 1947).
2. 3] So. (2d) 601, 604 (Italics supplied).
3. "Howevcr, that article [7091 cannot be reconciled with Articles 757 and
75S." 31 So. (2d) 601, 604.
4. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
5. Arts. 6$7-650, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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The whole title of servitudes is keyed to this fundamental concept
which is followed consistently throughout the chapter on conven-
tional servitudes, and is repeated and elaborated in Articles 754-758.
Article 754 provides "Servitudes being established on estates in
favor of other estates, and not in favor of persons, if the grant of
the right declare it to be for the benefit of another estate, there can
be no doubt as to the nature of this right, even though it should
not be called a servitude." Articles 755 to 758' consider the possible
variations both in the manner of description used and in the real
purpose to be accomplished, the latter being the only test to distin-
guish the true predial servitude from a service or a right of mere
personal convenience.
To take Articles 757 and 758 out of their immediate context,
and to read into them the phrase "personal servitude" which does
not appear there, and then to state that there is an irreconcilable
conflict between these articles and Article 709, is both misleading
and dangerous.
The phrase "personal servitude" does appear at the very begin-
ning of the title, in Article 646,' and the purpose there is to dis-
tinguish the personal servitudes of usufruct, use and habitation from
the predial servitudes which are the only ones dealt with in Title IV.
6. Art. 755, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If, on the other hand, the act establish-
ing the servitude does not declare that the right is given for the benefit of an
estate, but to a person who is the owner of it, it must then be considered whether
the right granted be of real advantage to the estate, or merely of personal con-
venience to the owner."
Art. 756, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the right granted be of a nature to
assure a real advantage to an estate, it is to be presumed that such right is a
real servitude, although it may not be so styled.
"Thus, for example, if the owner of a house contiguous to lands bordering
on the high road, should stipulate for the right of passing through lands, without
it being expressed that the passage is for the use of his house, it would be not
the less a real servitude, for it is evident that the passage is of real utility to
the house."
Art. 757, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If, on the other hahd, the concession from
its nature is a matter of mere personal convenience, it is considered personal,
and can not be made real but by express declaration of the parties.
"Thus for example, if the owner of a house near a garden or park, should
stipulate for the right of walking and gathering fruits and flowers therein, this
right would be considered personal to the individual, and not a servitude in favor
of the house or its owner.
"But the right becomes real and is a predial servitude, if the person stip-
ulating for the servitude, acquires it as owner of the house, and for himself, his
heirs and assigns."
Art. 758, La. Civil Code of 1870: "When the right granted is merely per-
sonal to the individual, it expires with him, unless the contrary has been expressly
stipulated."
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It is well recognized that the law of servitudes in the Civil Code
did not contemplate the regulation of the oil and mineral industry
in Louisiana. That the courts have done an admirable job in pro-
viding a system of property control with inadequate and unsuitable
materials is a very commendable achievement in the administration
of justice. However, it should not be in this extension of the law of
servitudes to the field of mineral rights that one should seek the
answers to general questions regarding the fundamental principles
of servitudes--especially where there is really no question and no
conflict.
Even if the court's argument were accepted, and a so-called
personal servitude recognized, the very Article 758 upon which it
bases this right would preclude the conclusion that the plaintiff had
stated a cause of action. The plaintiff is not the original owner, but
the heir of the person in whose favor this right was created; whereas
under Article 758 a "right" which is personal expires with that in-
dividual.
The facts of the case may make the court's decision appear as
the socially desirable result to prevent what might have been a harsh
injustice. The cause, however, lies not in the law of servitudes, but
in the carelessness or dishonesty of the original owner who failed to
include the agreed stipulations in the final acts of conveyance.
The decision here discussed was merely the dismissal of an
exception of no cause of action, and at the time of this writing, there
is no information as to any further proceedings. However, the lan-
guage used by the court has rather serious implications, and the
purpose of this extended discussion is to clarify one of the most basic
of all the principles in the law of servitudes, before it gets "devel-
oped" into more complicated situations.
In the case of Devoke v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad
Company' there is an interesting discussion about a servitude which
7. Art. 646, La. Civil Code of 1870: "All servitudes which affect lands may
be divided into two kinds, personal and real.
"Personal servitudes are those attached to the person for whose benefit they
are established, and terminate with his life. This kind of servitude Is of three
sorts: usufruct, use and habitation.
"Real servitudes, which are also called predial or landed aervitude*, are
those which the owner of an estate enjoys on a neighboring estate for the benefit
of his own estate.
"They are called predial or landed servitudes, because, being established for
the bcnefit of an estate, they are rather due to the estate than to the owner per-
sonallv.
This kind of aervitude forms the subject of the present title."
8. 2?1 La. 729, 30 So. (2d) 816 (1947), noted in (1947) 21 Tulane Law
Review 699.
[Vol. VIII
1948] WORK OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT 237
is generally observed amicably and therefore seldom litigated. It is
sometimes described as the "sic utere"' servitude. When a person
suffers damage from his neighbor's use of the adjoining property,
the usual idea for legal redress would be an action in tort, without
much thought being given to the possible applicability of this rule
of servitudes. In the present case, the complaint of the plaintiff
property owners was directed at the defendant on account of the
damage done by smoke and cinders emanating from the locomo-
tives in the railway company's terminal facilities (located in a resi-
dential section of Bossier City). This case was the sequel to the
earlier case of McGee v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Com-
pany1" in which the plaintiffs obtained injunctive relief and compen-
satory damages; and the present suit followed as a result of the
defendant's continued operation of the facilities. In the McGee
opinion, there was no reference to Articles 666-669 of the Civil Code;
the Devoke case seems to have been worked over more thoroughly
(with many participating amici curiae), and these code provisions
are pointed out as "the basic law of this state on the subject." This
is a servitude imposed by law on every estate to the effect that its
use should not damage or cause unreasonable inconvenience to other
estates. In the present case, the court found that the defendant
was violating this servitude without justification by reason of its
failure to install and employ modern available equipment (round
house building and tall central smokestack with a smoke eliminator)
to reduce the inconvenience and damage to neighboring estates.
The court stated specifically that this was not an action in tort,
thereby eliminating from consideration the question of fault and
negligence. There are probably many more civil law principles and
institutions which could serve society very well if they were not
being forgotten and overlooked into disuse.
A different kind of a servitude problem, regarding dedication
of a road, was presented in the case of James v. Delery.1 From the
clarity of the opinion and the virtual agreement as to facts, it may
be puzzling that the case was litigated to the state supreme court.
The dedication was shown by the combination of a positive intent
to dedicate the road in question and an actual use of it. Nevertheless,.
the dispute is not surprising because the law on the subject is none
too clear. To the Civil Code provisions regarding the private servi-
9. Sic utere tuo ut alionam non laedaa (so use your own as not to injure
another's property).
10. 206 La. 121, 19 So. (2d) 21 (1944).
11. 211 La. 806, 29 So. (2d) 858 (1947).
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tude of passage12 and the legal servitude of public roads, 3 there have
been added statutes relating to the dedication of streets and public
roads' 4 and also the crystallization of custom in the jurisprudence. 5
It would not be untimely to reexamine all this law with a view to
its coordination.
Building Restrictions
The validity of building restrictions is no longer questioned,
but occasionally a problem arises with regard to the interpretation
of one. In the case of Salerno v. de Lucca 6 the building restriction
"that there shall be no business establishments" was invoked as a
bar to the maintenance of a sign or billboard on one of the lots in
the subdivision. While it was admitted that the activity would be
excluded if the restriction were against the use of the property for
"business purposes," it was contended that the disputed use did not
come within the scope of "business establishments."
Since the restriction in this case is one so commonly encount-
ered, the court's opinion as to its interpretation will probably be
more far-reaching than the immediate litigation. The significance
of the decision lies in the fixing of a good faith or comprehensive
rule of interpretation rather than a narrow literal rule. Thus the
entire context must be considered in order to ascertain the real inten-
tion behind the restriction. In this particular subdivision there were
a few exceptional lots reserved "for business purposes for the con-
venience of lot owners." Accordingly, the court concluded that the
restriction intended all other lots to be used for residential purposes
exclusively. Under this interpretation, the sign or billboard came
within the prohibition.
However, the violation had been going on for more than two
years; and by virtue of Act 326 of 1938, the property had become
free from "the restriction which had been violated." This can hardly
be taken to mean freedom from the whole commercial restriction,
but only freedom to the extent that there had been a two-year un-
opposed violation, namely, in the placing of signs or billboards on
the property.
12. Arts. 699 et seq., 719, 722, 780, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. Arts. 665, 658, 707, La. Civil Code of 1870.
I t. E.g., la. Act 220 og 1914 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3634]; La. Act 51 of
1930 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5344-47].
15. Bomar v. City of Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926).
16i. 211 la. 659, 30 So. (2d) 678 (1947).
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Ownership
It is not so long ago that a vast amount of property which had
no previous value of any consequence, became the subject of exten-
sive litigation involving every phase of property law. The swamps
and the wastelands and every sort of water bottom received a full
legal treatment and respectable classification. The cases are now
thinning out and getting down to some of the more specific details.
Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Case'7 was a concursus proceed-
ing to determine the ownership of certain oil royalties, which in
turn depended upon the ownership of the property from which the
oil was produced. The land was alluvion or accretion which had
accumulated gradually to a riparian property, but there was dispute
as to whether it was on Grand Lake or on the body of water called
the Arm of Grand Lake. It has already been decreed that Grand
Lake itself is a navigable lake, and that its bed belongs to the
state.' 8 Since the law of accretion' 9 applies to the shores of rivers and
streams, the natural question is how to draw the line between the
two bodies of water where one flows into the other. Still the court
must decide cases, and in the present case they followed their prior
decision regarding the adjacent lot,2" that the land in question was
on the Arm of Grand Lake which was classified as a navigable
stream, and that the accretion belonged to the riparian proprietor.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
Acquirendi causa
In Meridian Land & Mineral Corporation v. Bagents,' two peti-
tory actions were brought by the record owners of a certain prop-
erty. The defendants were in physical possession and they pleaded
ownership by virtue of the thirty-year prescription. The basic con-
cept of acquisitive prescription is possession, and this concept is
quite different from actual physical control of the property. In the
present case, there was evidence that the defendants' ancestor had
fenced the land about 1911 and used it as a pasture. However, there
17. 210 La. 630, 2q So. (2d) 431 (1946).
18. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937).
19. Art. 509, La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14
So. (2d) 61 (1943).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 627, 30 So. (2d) 563 (1947).
